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government to fully adopt the European Commission proposals for a services directive.  The European 
Commission's 2004 proposals for a Services Directive consists of measures to reduce or eliminate the 
obstacles of cross-border trade of services by introducing the ‘country of origin’ principle. It implies that 
regulation of the country of origin is relevant, and that the country of destination has no right to impose 
new regulation.  
Our results indicate that the introduction of the 2004 EU services directive in Switzerland 
would very much intensify the economic relations between the service industries of Switzerland 
and the European Union. We have investigated the direct effects of mutual liberalisation of 
services markets. These are positive, both for Switzerland and the EU. Swiss exports of 
commercial services to the EU could increase by 40 to 84 per cent, while Swiss foreign direct 
investment stocks in EU services industries could increase by  20 to 41 per cent. EU services 
exports to Switzerland may rise by 41 to 85 per cent, while EU direct investment stocks in 
Swiss service markets could rise by 29 to 55 per cent.  
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Executive summary 
This report estimates the quantitative economic implications of a possible decision by the Swiss 
government to fully adopt the European Commission proposals for a services directive.   
 
The European Commission's 2004 proposals for a Services Directive consists of measures to 
reduce or eliminate the obstacles of cross-border trade of services by introducing the ‘country of 
origin’ principle. It implies that regulation of the country of origin is relevant, and that the 
country of destination has no right to impose new regulation. The European Commission has 
also proposed measures to reduce the obstacles for the establishment of an affiliate abroad by 
introducing a single point of contact for the service providers to deal with all rules and 
procedures. Moreover, the EC also introduces mechanisms to build up trust of the member 
states in each other national regulatory regimes. The EU proposal is only partially aimed at 
reducing the level of service market regulation in Member States, although local producers 
might benefit as well from some proposed measures that focus on the elimination of 
unnecessary and EU-incompatible national regulations. 
 
Our results indicate that the introduction of the 2004 EU services directive in Switzerland 
would very much intensify the economic relations between the service industries of Switzerland 
and the European Union. We have investigated the direct effects of mutual liberalisation of 
services markets. These are strictly positive, both for Switzerland and the EU.  
 
Our estimates are presented as a range of likely outcomes, given statistical uncertainties and 
uncertainties related to the eventual implementation form of the services directive. The results 
must therefore be interpreted as a likely order of magnitude of the long-term effects rather than 
as point forecasts. Keeping this in mind, Swiss exports of commercial services to the EU could 
increase by 40 to 84 per cent, while Swiss foreign direct investment stocks in EU services 
industries could increase by  20 to 41 per cent. EU services exports to Switzerland may rise by 
41 to 85 per cent, while EU direct investment stocks in Swiss service markets could rise by 
29 to 55 per cent.   
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1  Introduction 
This report estimates the quantitative economic implications of a possible decision by the Swiss 
government to fully adopt the European Commission proposals for a services directive.   
 
A cornerstone of the European Union (EU) is the principle that goods, services, capital and 
labour can move freely between the member states. The internal market for goods functions 
rather well, after the implementation of the Single Market programme in 1988. This is however 
not the case for the internal market in services. In most service sectors, still less than 5 per cent 
of production is exported to other EU member states.
1 The European Commission in March 
2004 launched its proposals for removing national regulatory obstacles for the growth of the 
intra-EU service market (European Commission 2004). A cornerstone of the present EU 
proposals is the introduction of the 'country of origin’ principle. For bilateral service trade it 
implies that only the product-market regulation of the service provider's origin country applies. 
This restricts the right of the importing country to impose discriminatory or additional 
regulations for foreign service providers. The commission has also proposed measures to reduce 
the obstacles for the establishment of an affiliate abroad by introducing a single point of contact 
for the service providers to deal with all rules and procedures. Moreover, the EC also introduces 
mechanisms to build up trust of the member states in each other national regulatory regimes. 
 
In recent months, the proposed EU Services Directive has been the object of much public 
discussion in EU countries. The European Commission has already announced some 
clarifications and changes in the proposals. The coming debate in the European Parliament 
(summer 2005) will probably result in further amendments.
2 The revised proposal will probably 
be available by the end of 2005 or early in 2006. If the EU Member States and the European 
Parliament agree with the revised proposal, the measures might still become effective in 2010. 
 
In this study we have taken the 2004 European Commission proposals as point of departure for 
the economic impact analysis. We focus on the role of inter-country regulation differences as a 
barrier to international trade and direct investment in services. The prime goal of the 2004 EU 
services directive is to reduce the role of these policy differences. CPB has quantified the 
possible impacts of these proposals on intra-EU service trade and direct investment in services. 
The results of that quantitative assessment are published in three publications.
3 We found that 
the proposed EU directive may lead to a substantial increase in bilateral trade and investment 
among EU member states. Commercial services trade could increase by about 30% to 60%. 
 
1 Cf. Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a). 
2 E.g. draft proposals by the European Parliament Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (EP, 2005).  
3 Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a; 2004b); Kox and Lejour (2004c).   
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Foreign direct investment stocks in services could increase by about 20% to 35%. Both the 
trade effect and the FDI effect will take some years to fully materialise.  
 
The present report quantifies the possible effects on the bilateral services trade and FDI between 
Switzerland and EU member states for a scenario in which Switzerland voluntarily adopts the 
EU services directive. We assume that this adoption goes along with a formal agreement 
between Switzerland and the EU on mutual recognition of services regulations. This would 
mean full integration of Switzerland in the European services market. The trade and direct 
investment effects that we have estimated for this scenario are well in the range that was already 
found for the trade and FDI effects between EU member states. The only exception in this 
regard is that foreign direct investment in the Swiss services economy would increase by 29 to 
55 per cent, which is more than in most EU states.
4  
 
This report was prepared on request of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(SECO), Division Growth and Competition Policy, as extension of  earlier CPB work on  trade 
and direct investment in the intra-European services market.  
Structure of the report 
The present report has the following structure. Chapter 2 outlines the basic facts about the 
current Swiss-EU trade and direct investment in services. Chapter 3 summarises the method and 
main results of CPB's earlier quantitative economic assessment of the proposals for EU member 
states. Chapter 4 extends this analysis to Switzerland: what would be the impacts for Swiss-EU 
trade and direct investment in services if Switzerland applied the same liberalisation proposals? 
Chapter 5 discusses the quantitative results, and analyses in which areas of product-market 
regulation in Switzerland the 2004 Services Directive could have most impacts. Finally, 
chapter 6 summarises the results.  
 
4 The main reason for this strong inward FDI effect is that the present Swiss regulations for FDI are more restrictive than 
holds on average for EU member states. Lowering the investment restrictions for EU services firms thus results in a 
relatively strong improvement of Swiss attractiveness as an investment destination.  
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2  Switzerland and the European services market 
Switzerland is surrounded by EU countries, and has many economic relations with the 
European Union. This chapter presents background statistics on the services trade between 
Switzerland and the EU, and on foreign direct investment relations between Switzerland and the 
EU. For consistency reasons with the following chapters, the emphasis is on data for the 
reference years 2001 for trade data, and 1999 for direct investment data. 
Trade in services 
Table 2.1 shows the composition of Swiss services exports and imports in 2001. The data 
include total Swiss services trade, including trade between Switzerland and non-EU countries. 
Switzerland has a remarkably large surplus in its services trade: the services exports are twice 
the amount of services imports. Most of this net position stems from financial services. If we 
 
Table 2.1  Composition of Switzerland services trade in 2001 
       Exports      Imports 
         
 
     Value in millions  
      of US dollars 
               Share (%)  
              in services  
                   exports 
Value in millions  
of US dollars 
Share (%)  
in services  
imports 
         
TOTAL SERVICES  27,726  100.0  13,386  100.0 
Transportation  4,439  16.0  3,246  24.2 
Travel  7,509  27.1  6,345  47.4 
Communications services  761  2.7  917  6.9 
Insurance services  1,064  3.8  74  0.6 
Financial services  7,628  27.5  651  4.9 
Other business services  4,692  16.9  1,973  14.7 
Personal, cultural and recreational 
services  6  0.0  65  0.5 
Government services, n.i.e.  1,626  5.9  110  0.8 
         
GOODS  86,457    89,211   
         
TOTAL GOODS AND SERVICES  114,183    102,597   
         
Source: OECD (2003) and own calculations.  
 
compare this to other EU countries (cf. Table 2.2), the 27.5% contribution of financial services 
to total services exports is very high. In contrast, the Swiss imports of financial services are 
quite small. Travel services (mainly tourism) form nearly half of the services imports. The share 
of 'other business services' -the sector that may be most affected by the EU services directive- 
is now relatively low in Swiss services trade.   
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Table 2.2  EU services exports, 2001 
  Value in billion US dollar  % share in total exports 
     
Transportation  144.5  22.8 
Travel  176.2  27.8 
Communication services  14.6  2.3 
Construction  15.9  2.5 
Insurance  15.1  2.4 
Financial services  44.3  7.0 
Other business services 
a)
  183.8  29.0 
Royalties and licence fees  20.5  3.2 
Personal services  6.9  1.1 
Government services  11.4  1.8 
     
Total services  633.1  100.0 
     
a) Including Computer and information services.  
Source: Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004b), based on data from OECD (2003a) and own calculations. 
 
 
Table 2.3 focuses on the most important trading partners of Switzerland in other commercial 
services trade. This sector includes other business services, information services, finance and 
insurance and personal, cultural and recreational services. The limited statistical information 
available on Swiss services exports does not allow us to split off the data on Finance and 
insurance from the rest of services trade. Even at the aggregation level of other commercial 
services, not all trade data are available for bilateral trade with the EU15 countries. 
 
What table 2.3 does show is the strong geographical concentration in Swiss services trade. 
Germany is the most important export destination. Together with Belgium-Luxembourg it 
accounts for half the Swiss services exports to the EU. Four other countries (Italy, France, UK 
and The Netherlands) together account for another 40 per cent of commercial services exports, 
each country receiving about 10 per cent.  
 
On the import side, the country concentration is hardly less. Germany and the United Kingdom 
supply about half of Switzerland's imports of commercial services. Other relevant trading 
partners are France, Italy, and The Netherlands. The Swiss total services trade balance with the 
EU is about in equilibrium: the value of EU import and export is approximately the same. In 
combination with Table 2.1 this suggests that the large trade surplus in financial services is 
mostly accounted for by the non-EU countries. However, the low quality and disclosure of 
services trade data may also play a role.  
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Table 2.3  Trade relations between Switzerland and the EU in 'other commercial services' 
b)
, 2001 
       Exports       Imports 
         
 
     Value in millions  
      of US dollars 
               Share (%)  
              in services  
                   exports 
     Value in millions  
      of US dollars 
               Share (%)  
              in services  
                   imports 
         
Germany  5,104  34  3,970  24 
Belgium-Luxembourg  2,517  17  2,517  15 
Italy  1,824  12  1,579  9 
France  1,579  10  1,778  11 
Netherlands  1,534  10  1,295  8 
United Kingdom  1,366  9  3,921  23 
Austria  653  4  787  5 
Sweden  371  2  662  4 
Spain   ..  ..   ..  .. 
Denmark   ..  ..   ..  .. 
Portugal  107  1  109  1 
Greece  88  1  131  1 
Finland  76  0  46  0 
Ireland   ..  ..   ..  .. 
         
Subtotal disclosed EU15 
a)
  15,217  100  16,794  100 
         
         
Source : OECD (2004)) and own calculations 
a) Most figures are based on the registered observations of the partner trading countries of Switzerland.  Denmark, Ireland, and Spain do 
not report bilateral services trade flows with Switzerland.  
b) The aggregate "Other commercial services"  includes: Trade and Distribution, Business Services, Hotels and Restaurants, Personal 
Services, Construction, and Financial Services. Transport and travel services are excluded. 
 
Foreign direct investment  
In 1999, the value of Swiss FDI stock in the EU15 amounts to about 100 billion US dollars. A 
quarter of it is invested in the United Kingdom, and 18 per cent in Germany. Other important 
EU destinations for Swiss investors are France, Belgium-Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
Further details are shown in Table 2.4.  
 
The inward FDI stock in Switzerland coming from the EU15 countries amounts only to 
50 billion US dollar in 1999. This amount may be an underestimation, because data on some 
bilateral FDI stocks are missing. Table 2.4 displays that France, Germany and the Netherlands 
are the most important investors in Switzerland. Note that these numbers refer to foreign direct 
investment in all sectors. There are no data on bilateral data FDI positions at a sectoral level.  
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Table 2.4  Foreign direct investment relations between Switzerland and the EU: FDI stocks, 1999 
  Swiss FDI stocks in the EU  EU FDI stocks in Switzerland  
         
 
value in millions  
of US dollars 
Share (%)  
in total 
value in millions  
of US dollars 
Share (%)  
in total 
United Kingdom  23,858  24  5,054  10 
Germany  17,820  18  11,618  23 
Netherlands  12,554  13  14,013  28 
France  11,041  11  10,221  21 
Belgium-Luxembourg  8,498  9  3,749  8 
Ireland  6,841  7  ..   ..  
Italy  6,498  7  3,679  7 
Spain  3,708  4  326  1 
Austria  2,950  3  366  1 
Greece  1,542  2  ..   ..  
Denmark  790  1  549  1 
Sweden  1,334  1  283  1 
Finland  1,193  1  ..   ..  
Portugal  1,162  1  ..   ..  
         
Total EU15   99,789  100  49,858  100 
         
Source : OECD (2004) and data reported by SECO, own calculations. 
 
 
Although there is no public information available on the sectoral classification of bilateral FDI 
stocks, we have some information for the total outward and inward FDI stock for Switzerland. 
Table 2.5 shows that the Swiss total outward FDI stock in 1999 amounts to 200 billion US 
dollars. According to table 2.4 about half of the stock is destined to the EU15. Two-thirds of the 
total stock is invested in services sectors, which is higher than in the EU. Moreover, 85 per cent 
of all Swiss services FDI is concentrated in the finance and insurance sector. The remaining 
Swiss FDI stock in the services sector mainly originates from the business services sector. The  
 
Table 2.5  Sectoral classification of Swiss FDI stocks (outward and inward), 1999 
             Outward FDI stock            Inward FDI stock 
         
  Millions US$  share (%)  Millions US$  share (%) 
Manufacturing  71,176    11.719   
Total services  135,915  100.0  69.161  100.0 
Trade services  8,483  6.2  10.020  14.5 
Finance and insurance  115,352  84.9  55.155  79.7 
Transport  4,663  3.4  1.772  2.6 
Other services  7,417  5.5  2.213  3.2 
Total goods and services  207,091    80.879   
 
Source: Schweizerische Nationalbank  
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foreign FDI stocks in Switzerland (from all origins) is also mainly invested in financial 
services. Only a small part invested in the other services and trade sector, much less than in the 
EU on average (cf. Kox, Lejour and Montizaan 2004a).  
 
The sectoral structure of FDI implies that most of the Swiss outward direct investment stock is 
in sectors that will be unaffected by the EU services directive: banking, insurance, financial 
holding companies and transport (see Figure 2.1).  
 


















































Manufacturing Services not under EU services directive Services under EU services directive
Data source: Schweizerische Nationalbank / CPB  
 
Figure 2.2 shows that for foreign direct investment stocks in Switzerland a completely different 
picture holds: more than 70 per cent of these investments is in sectors that will be affected by 
the EU services directive: trade, distribution and 'other services'. The share of  these sectors in 
inward foreign direct investment stocks has hardly changed during last decade.  
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3  Method of analysis and application to intra-EU trade and 
FDI  
Services trade is hardly subject to import tariffs. Most trade barriers in services are of a non-
tariff nature. National regulations play an important role in this respect. This chapter analyses 
the nature of non-tariff barriers to international services trade, and especially the negative 
impact of international regulation differences on international trade and investment in services. 
We describe a new method to quantify the impact of policy heterogeneity on trade and direct 
investment. This methodology is used for estimating the impact of policy heterogeneity on 
intra-EU trade and FDI in services. The results of that analysis are applied for assessing the 
impacts of the EU services directive.  
3.1  Regulation in service markets  
Most services cannot be stored and shipped abroad (in a box or as computer file), but require 
the proximity of producers and consumers. Either the consumer has to move abroad as is often 
the case with tourism services. Or the producer has to go to the country of the consumer for 
delivering the service. The latter is the dominant form of delivering services in another country. 
The service provider himself, his staff, his equipment and material therefore cross national 
borders. Foreign service delivery may mean that some or all stages of the business process take 
place in the country where the service is delivered. It is here that the non-tariff barriers 
generally start, because the service provider becomes subject to local regulations in the foreign 
market. Many national service markets are still regulated in some way or another. The text box 
briefly deals with the reasons for this.  
Regulation of service markets 
Service markets have a long history of regulation. Partly, this is due to the externalities that the production of some 
services may cause for third parties, such as environmental effects of transport, the impact of bank reliability on the 
overall financial system, or the safety aspects of building design. But there is also a more innate cause for government 
intervention that may have to do with the very nature of the service product. The production and consumption of the 
service often cannot be separated in place and time, making it difficult to standardise a service product. The quality of 
the product is a priori uncertain for the consumer – more than in the case for commodities. For a simple service product 
such as a haircut, this uncertainty problem is generally manageable. The information problem for the individual service 
buyer is however more serious in the case of complex professional and medical services that require the input of 
specialist knowledge. The buyer of such service products is confronted with a structural information asymmetry as to the 
quality of the service product, sometimes even after the transaction took place. To counter such structural asymmetries 
(and their imminent fraud possibilities) government authorities sometimes apply strict regulations for certain professional 
services.  
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The OECD has developed aggregate indexes which makes it possible to compare the relative 
regulation intensity of countries. These indexes have been developed for product-market 
regulation and for restrictions on foreign direct investment.
5 Table 3.1 presents the levels of 
product market regulation and FDI restrictions for Switzerland and the EU countries. According 
to these OECD indicators, Switzerland has a relatively high degree of regulation. The level of  
 
Table 3.1  Aggregate OECD indicators for the relative intensity of product-market regulation and FDI 
restrictions, EU countries, 1998 
Country  Product-market 
regulation 
FDI restrictions    Country  Product-market 
regulation 
FDI restrictions 
             
United Kingdom  0.5  0.064    Portugal  1.7  0.157 
Ireland  0.8  0.074    Finland  1.7  0.177 
Netherlands  1.4  0.083    Switzerland  1.8  0.169 
Germany  1.4  0.084    Belgium  1.9  0.091 
Denmark  1.4  0.087    France  2.1  0.111 
Sweden  1.4  0.140    Greece  2.2  0.130 
Austria  1.4  0.268    Italy  2.3  0.097 
Spain  1.6  0.165    Czech Republic  2.9  0.196 
Hungary  1.6  0.173    Poland  3.3  0.249 
 
Sources: Product-market regulation indices are from Nicoletti et al. (2000), and FDI restriction indices are from Golub (2003). 
 
product market regulation is slightly above the average. The Swiss regulation intensity is 
comparable to that of Portugal and Finland; it exceeds the EU average. Switzerland is also 
relatively restrictive towards FDI, although the restrictiveness indicator is not as high as it is for 
Austria.  
3.2  Impact of regulation on trade and direct investment in services  
The fact that a national service market is regulated is not in itself an important barrier to 
international services trade. This can be shown by a little thought experiment. Suppose that all 
countries have the same type of regulation, for instance, a qualification requirement for 
providers producing a particular service product. Since qualification costs are mainly fixed 
costs, it would cost an exporting firm a one-off effort to comply with the qualification criteria. 
Once having incurred these fixed qualification costs, the firm would even have an incentive to 
export more. The reason is that by enlarging its production through exports into other countries, 
the firm could reap economies of scale (cost economies).  
 
5 Nicoletti et al. (2000); Golub (2003).  
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Impact of heterogeneous regulation for services markets 
However, such a uniform system of regulation for service markets does not exist. Countries 
often have little confidence in the quality of each other’s legal regimes and are reluctant to 
adapt their own regimes where necessary to facilitate cross-border activities. Each authority 
uses its own system of quality safeguards for domestic consumers and service buyers, also 
within the European Union. This system of national regulations is a nuisance for international 
service trade. Service exporters are confronted with different regulations and requirements in 
each destination country. The system leads to additional costs for exporters, and thus weakens 
international competition in services markets.
6 As Table 3.2 indicates, such compliance costs 
typically are one-off fixed costs. 
Table 3.2    National product-market regulations for service markets 
Primary impact on:   
 









Restrictions on import quantity (entry prohibition, local content 
requirements, restricted network access)  
      X 
Controlled import prices (reference, minimum or maximum price)      X   
Market access costs related to import volume (entry or exit taxes, visa 
costs, differentiated tariffs by firm origin, postal tariffs)  
  X     
Firm start-up licenses and associated authorisation requirements  X       
Service-providing personnel must have locally recognised professional 
qualifications (may necessitate re-qualification) 
X       
Obligatory membership of local professional association  X       
Juridical requirements (owners or managers of service-providing firm must 
have local residence or nationality, firms must have a specific legal form) 
X       
Requirement that service providers have nationally recognised liability 
insurance or professional indemnity insurance. 
X       
All service activities in export destination country fully subject to regular 
administrative and tax procedures 
X       
Limitations on inter-professional co-operation or on the variety of services 
provided by one firm (may require unbundling) 
X       
Temporary service personnel from origin country fully subject to rules of the 
social security system of the destination country 
X       
Impediments for material inputs, suppliers and personnel from origin 
country (may require a search for new local suppliers) 
X       
 
6 O’Mahony and Van Ark (2003) find that the widening gap between the EU and the US in economic growth per capita is to 
an important extent caused by the fact that the USA succeeds better than the EU in raising the productivity of service 
industries. It might be very difficult to strengthen the competitiveness and efficiency of service industries without alleviating 
the effects of national regulatory barriers to the cross-border provision of services.  
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National regulations and requirements for service providers are not in themselves a trade 
barrier. Often these requirements are not explicitly discriminatory for foreign providers, 
because both domestic and foreign providers have to comply with the same regulation. Such 
national regulations can therefore be fully compatible with WTO principles of non-
discrimination.  
 
The national regulations become trade barriers because they mostly do not acknowledge that the 
foreign firm may already have qualified itself. Hence, the problem is the additivity: each 
national requirement comes on top of  (similar or slightly different) regulations that the firm has 
already complied with in its home market or in other countries where it operates. Meeting the 
national requirements often creates additional costs that are not related to the trade volume. The 
foreign service firm must re-qualify itself before being allowed to sell one single product.
7  
 
Figure 3.1    Cost effect of regulation heterogeneity (perspective of exporting firm) 
































 avg. costs in case of  mutual recognition
 avg. costs per export market in case of regulation
heterogeneity
home market export market 1 export market 2 export market 3
 
Policy heterogeneity results in a wasteful duplication of fixed policy compliance costs, with two 
economic consequences for the individual services firm. First, it causes additional fixed costs 
for entering a particular foreign market. Secondly, it leads to a loss of potential scale 
economies. Due to the fact that the fixed qualification costs are specific for a national market, 
the costs cannot be spread out over production that is destined for other foreign markets. 
Regulation heterogeneity restricts the realisation of economies of scale in complying with 
 
7 Such costs often are independent of firm size. The result is that in relative terms the strongest effect of policy heterogeneity 
falls upon small- and medium-size service firms.  
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regulations, and it increases costs for internationally operating services firms. Figure 3.1 
pictures both effects for a services firm that subsequently enters three export markets, and each 
time incurs the same level of additional fixed qualification costs.
8 Foreign market entry each 
time goes along with increased average costs. 
Implicitly, Figure 3.1 shows the cost and efficiency gains that can be attained by a system that 
allows firms to achieve more economies of scale in dealing with regulation requirements. The 
dotted line reflects the situation that would arise if countries mutually recognise home-country 
qualifications of the firm. It shows that cost and efficiency gains can be attained by an 
internationally co-ordinated qualification system for service firms.  
 
Summing up, regulation-caused fixed qualification costs are not in themselves an impediment 
to international trade in services. The regulatory requirements do become a trade barrier if they 
differ strongly between countries.
9 Stated differently, we may derive the hypothesis that 
bilateral service trade between countries is negatively affected by the degree of policy 
heterogeneity for service markets. Kox, Lejour and Montizaan (2004a) found strong 
econometric evidence in support of this hypothesis. In the remainder of this chapter we briefly 
describe our earlier empirical work and how this formed the basis for assessing the quantitative 
impacts of the proposed EU services directive. 
3.3  Quantifying policy heterogeneity 
Policy heterogeneity has many dimensions, and does not easily lend itself for a quantitative 
analysis, let alone in an internationally comparative context. In order to test the predictions from 
our theoretical framework empirically, we have developed a new index for bilateral policy 
heterogeneity.  
 
For this we could build on the path-breaking data work by a team of OECD researchers (cf. 
Nicoletti et al. 2000). They developed an international database on national product-market 
regulations, mainly fed by official inputs from governments of OECD member states. The 
OECD International Regulation database is by far the most detailed and structured dataset on 
national differences in product-market regulation. It gives per country information on more than 
 
8 The underlying model assumes that the exporter sequentially enters other EU markets, after exploiting the local demand 
potential of each market. The impact on the establishment of foreign firms (FDI, commercial presence) is more or less 
similar. 
9 The cost for complying with regulation then turn into country-specific sunk costs for market entry. In case of failure in the 
foreign market, they become exit costs. The lump-sum costs create a market-entry hurdle, with a negative impact on 
exports. In relative terms, this hurdle is largest for small- and medium-sized firms. Firms only enter the market if the 
expected sales are large enough to cover the sunk market-entry costs.  
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1000 aspects of product-market regulation.
10 From this we made a selection of almost 200 most 
relevant indicators of national product-market regulation that may affect the services markets in 
which we are interested. These comparison items are of a more or less general nature, or at least 
they can be considered as a pars pro toto for a country's overall approach in product market 
regulation. 
 
Our index for bilateral regulatory heterogeneity builds upon detailed pair-wise comparisons 
between individual countries for specific aspects of product market regulation, both regarding 
the form and the contents of the regulation. For each policy comparison item we assess whether 
two countries are identical or not. It yields information of a binary nature: when the two 
countries differ in that particular regulation item we assign a value of 1, and when there is no 
difference we assign the value of 0 to the regulation heterogeneity index. In this way we may 
derive an average policy heterogeneity index for each specific country pair. Its value ranges 
between 1 in case of complete dissimilarity and 0 in case of identical product-market 
regulations. The overall index of bilateral heterogeneity in product-market regulation can also 
be decomposed for policy sub-domains. For the decomposition we use the OECD's own 
classification (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3          Product-market regulation: OECD classification of domains and sub-domains 
  Main policy domains  Policy sub-domains 




State control (SC)  * Size and scope of public enterprise sectors (PO) 
* Existence and extent of special right over business enterprises (IBO) 
* Use of price controls, legislative control and other command and control 
regulations in the economy (IBO) 
     
  Barriers to 
entrepreneurship (BE) 
* Barriers to competition (BC): legal entry conditions, anti-trust   
   exemptions, registering, competition restrictions, regulation of public 
   procurement  
* Regulatory and administrative opacity (RAO): licensing and permit 
   systems, communication and implementation of rules and procedures  
* Administrative burdens on start-ups (ABS): start-up procedures, entry 
  capital, start-up delays 




Explicit barriers to trade 
and investment (EBT) 
* Barriers for foreign share ownership  
* Discriminating procedures in trade and investment 
* Trade tariffs  
     
  Other barriers (TOB)  * Regulatory trade barriers 
 
 
10 The base year is 1998. In the mean time, an updated version has been published for the year 2003 (cf. Conway et al. 
2005), but the 1998 version is still perfect in combination with trade and FDI data for 1999-2001 and 1999, respectively.    
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The structure of regulatory heterogeneity by policy sub-domain in a nutshell yields much 
information about policy differences between countries. As an illustration Table 3.4 presents 
data on the average policy heterogeneity between EU member states, and between Switzerland 
and EU member states. Swiss product-market regulation -except for the sub-domain State 
control- on average differs a bit more from the EU14 average than EU14 countries differ 
among themselves.  
Table 3.4       Bilateral policy heterogeneity between EU14 member states,
a)
 and between Switzerland and 
                      EU member states, 1998 
  Average between EU member 
states, EU14  
Between Switzerland and EU14 
member states 
     
Regulatory and administrative opacity   0.38  0.39 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment  0.21  0.28 
Administrative burdens on start-ups   0.55  0.63 
Barriers to competition   0.32  0.34 
State control   0.42  0.41 
     
Overall PMR heterogeneity indicator  0.39  0.41 
     
Note: a) Excluding Luxembourg due to insufficient data.  
 
3.4  Impact of regulation on bilateral trade in services  
A next step is to assess econometrically which areas of policy heterogeneity have most impact 
on bilateral trade and on FDI in services.  
 
In the empirical analysis we focus on bilateral trade in commercial services, hence disregarding 
government services. Moreover, we exclude transport and tourism because both services trade 
categories are quite special. Transport because it is strongly related to the total volume of goods 
trade, and is subject to particular regulatory regimes quite different from overall product-market 
regulation (e.g. because of environmental externalities). Tourism trade is excluded because in 
most of this trade consumers rather than producers move to the foreign country, and because it 
to a large extent is determined by factors like climate, weather conditions and cultural heritage. 
Tourism is also subject to relatively few product-market regulations. 
 
For explaining bilateral commercial service trade between EU member states we use a gravity 
model as is widely applied for the analysis of bilateral trade patterns. The model explains the 
bilateral trade from the following variables: the distance and differences in languages between 
countries (as measure for trade costs), GDP in the countries of origin and destination (as a 
measure for market size and scale effects), and regulatory barriers. For the latter we investigate  
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both the impact of the level and the heterogeneity of national product market regulations. We 
correct for unobserved variables in both origin and destination country.  
 
The full regression results with regard to bilateral trade are specified in the first two data 
columns in Annex 1. The empirical analysis shows that the level and the heterogeneity of 
regulation between countries has a significant negative effect on bilateral trade in commercial 
services.
11 Various specifications and estimation methods lead to similar results: the intensity of 
regulation and its heterogeneity are variables that significantly affect the volume of trade in 
commercial services. The most important conclusions for the EU14 are: 
·  Heterogeneity in two areas of product market regulation (Barriers to competition and Explicit 
barriers to trade and investment) has a markedly negative impact on trade in commercial 
services. Heterogeneity in Barriers to competition has the largest effect of both.  
·  A high level of domestic regulation has a negative impact on the origin country's services 
exports and a negative impact on service imports from other EU Member States.  
·  Variables for the other components of regulatory heterogeneity have no statistically significant 
impact on commercial service trade.  
 
 
3.5  Impact of regulation on bilateral direct investment  
A similar econometric exercise was done for testing the hypothesis that policy heterogeneity 
and regulation intensity have a negative impact on foreign direct investment in services. For 
explaining bilateral direct investment stocks we adapted the gravity model with elements of the 
knowledge-capital model developed by Markusen (2002). The latter model is becoming the 
standard explanation for direct investment decisions by multinational enterprises. It allows for 
an integrated treatment of trade and direct investment decisions in international service markets.  
 
For explaining bilateral direct investment stocks we use the following variables: the distance 
and differences in languages between countries (as measure for trade costs), GDP in the country 
of origin and destination (as a measure for market size and scale effects), the labour 
productivity level in the service sector of the origin country (as a measure for technological 
advantage), and regulatory barriers. For the latter we investigate both the level and the 
heterogeneity of national product market regulations and FDI restrictions. We correct for 
 
11 The OECD data for trade in commercial services includes Trade and Distribution, Business Services, Hotels and 
Restaurants, Personal Services, Construction, and Financial Services. We do not consider Transport services and Travel 
services, since they are not covered by the EU directive, and because they differ with regard to non-tariff barriers (cf. Kox, 
Lejour and Montizaan, 2004a: Ch.4).   
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unobserved variables in origin and destination country. The regression equation for explaining 
bilateral direct investment stocks is specified in the Annex 1 (last two data columns). 
 
The augmented gravity model explains a considerable part of the variation in bilateral FDI 
stocks in the EU. A strong tendency is that countries with a higher domestic productivity in 
services tend to invest more in other countries. With regard to the policy variables, we find that: 
·  Direct investment between EU countries is strongly (and in a negative sense) affected by the 
regulation level and by inter-country heterogeneity of product-market regulation.  
·  Countries with the lowest level of product market regulation export and invest more abroad 
than others.
12  
·  FDI restrictions in the destination country have a strong negative impact on foreign direct 
investment.  
·  Heterogeneity in Barriers to competition and State control have a significant and negative 
effect on the level of bilateral FDI. Heterogeneity in the other indicators for regulatory 
heterogeneity have no statistically significant impact on FDI stocks.  
 
3.6  The impact of the EU services directive on regulation heterogeneity 
The results so far were used for quantifying the possible impacts of the European Commission's 
2004 proposals for a Services Directive.  
 
The EC undertook a comprehensive stocktaking of the obstacles hampering the functioning of 
the internal EU market for services. It resulted in a nightmarish picture of the state of the EU's 
Internal Market for Services (EU 2002). All stages of the business process are affected by a 
proliferation of national regulations: the establishment of firms, the use of inputs, promotional 
activities, distribution forms of a service, the sales process itself, and the after-sales 
organisation. Foreign service providers often are confronted by national regulations such as 
requirements for additional professional qualification, local residence of management, 
additional professional insurance, and constraints on the use of inputs from their origin country. 
Sometimes regulation procedures and their application are not transparent, thus creating 
uncertainty for foreign service providers.  
It is in response to this situation that the European Commission launched its Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the Internal Market 
(EC 2004). It is aimed at boosting the EU's Internal Market in Services by reducing regulation-
based impediments to trade and investment in the service market. The European Commission 
 
12 This is in line with the Porter hypothesis that countries with open markets become more competitive, and will easier 
operate in foreign markets (Porter 1990).   
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regards these measures as a cornerstone for raising the productivity and competitiveness of the 
European economy, since more than half the latter consists of market services. The proposals 
consists of measures to reduce or eliminate the obstacles of cross-border trade of services by 
introducing the ‘country of origin’ principle. It implies that regulation of the country of origin is 
relevant, and that the country of destination has no right to impose new regulation. The 
commission has also proposed measures to reduce the obstacles for the establishment of an 
affiliate abroad by introducing a single point of contact for the service providers to deal with all 
rules and procedures. Moreover, the EC also introduces mechanisms to build up trust of the 
member states in each other national regulatory regimes. The EU proposal is only partially 
aimed at reducing the level of service market regulation in Member States, although local 
producers might benefit as well from some proposed measures that focus on the elimination of 
unnecessary and EU-incompatible national regulations.  
The EU directive does not cover all service sectors and not all elements of product-market 
regulation. Some policy sub-domains are more affected than others. At a detailed level we 
assessed the concordance between the OECD regulation item and the aspects covered by the 
proposed EU directive. Based on close reading we assess for each of 187 policy items whether 
the policy item will be unaffected, moderately affected or heavily affected  by the EU directive. 
If a policy areas is not affected, heterogeneity with regard to that regulation item persists after 
full implementation of the EU proposals.  
This item-wise assessment has been aggregated for five sub-domains of product-market 
regulation. If all items in a policy sub-domain would be fully affected by the EU directive, the 
expected impact is a 100% reduction of heterogeneity among EU member states. If no items are 
affected, the expected impact is 0%. Because of the uncertain impact of the EU directive on 
regulatory items that are partially affected, we use a bandwidth indicating a minimum and a 
maximum effect. Table 3.5 gives the results.  
Table 3.5          Expected impacts of proposed EU measures on intra-EU policy heterogeneity, by sub-domain 
Components of heterogeneity indicator and covered policy domains   Reduction of the components of indicator due to 
implementation EU directive 
a)
 
   
Regulatory and administrative opacity   66 - 77 % 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment  73 - 78 % 
Administrative burdens on start-ups   34 - 46 % 
Barriers to competition   29 - 37 % 
State control   3 -   6 % 
   
Overall PMR heterogeneity indicator  reduction 31 - 38 % 
  a)
  Based on detailed item-wise consideration of the match between the EU directive and all 187 specific regulation items selected from 
the OECD database.  
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The table shows that the heterogeneity components Regulatory and administrative opacity and 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment are heavily affected by the EU directive. The 
heterogeneity components Administrative barriers for start-ups and Barriers to competition are 
moderately affected by the EU directive and the component State control is hardly affected. The 
State control regulation items mainly relate to network sectors, and the latter are not included in 
the proposed EU directive. The numbers in table 3.5 are used later on to assess the impact of 
less regulation heterogeneity on trade and direct investment. 
 
Impact of the EU proposals: scenario analysis 
The estimated coefficients from the preferred regressions for bilateral service trade and for 
bilateral direct investment stocks (cf. Annex 1) have been used as the basis for quantifying the 
potential impact of the EU proposal in the internal market for services. For direct investment, 
our scenario includes the effect of a lower level of national FDI restrictions in the destination 
countries.
13 We did not account for different implementation stages, but instead we quantified 
the effects of full implementation of the EU directive, indicating the bandwidth of the resulting 
maximal effects on service trade and direct investment.  
This procedure yielded the following results. The full implementation of the proposed directive 
could increase commercial service trade by 30 per cent to 62 per cent, while the percentage 
increase of foreign direct investment in services in the EU is between 18 per cent and 36 per 
cent. The bandwidth in outcomes represents the uncertainty in the effect of the EU directive on 
the reduction in regulatory heterogeneity (cf. Table 3.5), and the statistical uncertainty with 
regard to parameter estimates.
14 The increase in trade and FDI is mainly caused by a reduction 
in the heterogeneity of the Barriers to competition. This policy sub-domain appears to be of 
crucial importance for services trade and investment.  
 
13 For the level effect we assume a 30% reduction for investors from other EU member states. This is a conservative 
estimate, since the many existing FDI restrictions are explicitly discriminatory with regard to foreign firms. 
14 We used an interval of the estimated coefficient plus and minus one standard error.  
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Table 3.6  Policy factors underlying the increase in trade and direct investment in commercial services 
  Minimum effects  Maximum effects 
     
Total intra EU trade increase  30  62 
of which:      
*  Increase due to reduced heterogeneity in Barriers to competition  25  51 
*  Increase due to reduced heterogeneity in Explicit barriers for 
   trade and investment 
5  11 
     
Total intra EU FDI increase  18  36 
of which:     
*  Increase due to reduced heterogeneity in Barriers to competition  7  18 
*  Increase due to less FDI restrictions (level effect)  
a)
  11  16 
*  Increase due to less heterogeneity in State control  0  2 
      a)
  In the scenarios we assume that investors from other EU countries will experience a 30% reduction in the level of FDI restriction of the 
destination country.  
 
For FDI, also the reduced intensity of FDI restriction is of importance, as shown in Table 3.6. 
Our analysis concentrated on cumulative direct investment stocks, and since the adaptation of 
FDI stocks occurs mainly through annual FDI flows, the effect on annual direct investment 
flows will be much higher. To what extent this is the case depends on the length of the 
adaptation period. 
3.7  Impacts of the 2004 Services Directive in the EU: conclusions 
We derive firm indications that the EU service sector might benefit from the proposed EU 
directive through a substantial increase in international trade and investment. Assuming full 
implementation of the 2004 proposals, we estimate that bilateral commercial service trade could 
increase by about 30 to 62 per cent. Commercial service trade forms about one-tenth of total 
trade within the EU. This suggests that total intra-EU trade could increase by 2 to 5 per cent. 
FDI stocks in services could increase by about 18% to 36%.  
These results indicate an order of magnitude. The impact analysis focused on trade flows 
and investment stocks; it does not provide a full welfare analysis. Possible welfare effects may 
result from price and income effects of the measures, but like the possible effects on innovation 
and productivity these have not been part of our analysis.   
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4  Switzerland lines up with EU liberalisation of services 
markets: quantitative effects  
This chapter quantifies what happens if the Swiss government decides to voluntarily apply the 
2004 EU Services Directive, and reaches an agreement with the EU on mutual recognition of 
national service regulations. We focus on the impacts for Swiss-EU trade and direct investment 
between Switzerland and the EU. 
4.1  Data and methodology 
The basic methodology for Switzerland is the same as applied for the EU. We comment first on 
the data basis for this analysis and subsequently on the trade elasticities for policy 
heterogeneity. 
 
A first step was to complete the dataset of bilateral trade in commercial services between 
Switzerland and all individual EU member states. The reference period here again is 1999-
2001. The bilateral data on services trade are drawn from OECD (2004) and supplementary data 
supplied by SECO. We use the OECD trade aggregate "Other commercial services" that 
includes trade in Trade and Distribution, Business Services, Hotels and Restaurants, Personal 
Services, Construction, and Financial Services. Transport and travel services are excluded. 
Missing trade data have been completed by using data from partner countries. In some cases the 
reporting country and the partner country reported different bilateral trade. For these cases we 
applied the Lejour-Verheijden (2004) regression method for identifying the countries whose 
reported bilateral trade coincided best with the mirror report by their partner countries. This was 
used for a statistical reliability ranking of countries. By using - in case of conflicting data- the 
data of the most reliable reporter of the two reporters we have completed our bilateral trade 
dataset. Data for 2000 and 2001 are deflated to correct for nominal differences caused by US 
dollar inflation. 
 
The same data procedure has been applied for bilateral data on inward foreign direct investment 
stocks of Switzerland and the EU member states. The data represent the total stock of foreign 
direct investment in a particular reporting country, with the stock detailed per country of origin, 
i.e. per country from where the multinational company invested in the reporting country.
15 We 
used OECD data on bilateral FDI stocks and supplementary data for Switzerland, supplied by 
 
15 Bilateral FDI stocks are used rather than annual FDI flows, for three reasons. The first reason is a very practical one: to 
our knowledge there is no authorised international dataset available for bilateral FDI flows. The second reason is that stock 
data are closer to the level of actual production by foreign affiliates than annual flow data. Thirdly, bilateral FDI flows are 
very volatile from one year to another; a few large transactions like mergers may cause large swings in the annual data, 
sometimes causing negative flows.  
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SECO. Missing data were completed by using data from the partner country. In those cases that 
the reporting country and the partner country published substantially different figures on 
bilateral FDI stocks, we applied a similar procedure for selecting the most reliable reporting 
country as we applied for bilateral trade data. All bilateral FDI data are for the year 1999. A 
serious handicap for our research is that –as of yet- no authorised international data set is 
available for bilateral FDI stocks in the services sector. Sectoral data of FDI stock and flow data 
are available on a country basis, but not on a bilateral basis with countries of origin and 
destination specified. We therefore use bilateral total FDI stock data, covering all sectors.
16 In 
order to prevent that these non-services effects create a bias in estimating the impact of the EU 
directive on investment, we apply a weighting procedure to exclude effects on sectors that are 
not affected by the proposed EU directive. Chapter 5 discusses the sensitivity of our FDI results 
for this weighting procedure. 
 
For Swiss-EU services trade we have applied the same elasticities as we have estimated for the 
impact of regulatory heterogeneity on intra-EU trade in other commercial services. The reason 
for doing so is that in our opinion Swiss data fit very well within the sample of the EU data. The 
sample homogeneity holds for all relevant data areas:  
·  Policy variables: Swiss - EU data with regard to the relevant policy variables do not display 
systematic or very large differences. The bilateral heterogeneity in product market regulation 
between Switzerland and the EU countries is in a range comparable to bilateral heterogeneity 
among EU countries (cf. Table 3.4). The same holds for the level of regulation intensity 
(Table 3.1). 
·  Services trade: Swiss services trade (other commercial services) is relatively large compared to 
other small countries like Ireland or Austria. It is, however, comparable to that of Belgium-
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and smaller than German and UK services trade. So, the 
Swiss trade data fit in our EU sample. 
·  Bilateral FDI stock: The Swiss outward and inward FDI positions are comparable to those of 
Belgium-Luxembourg and Italy. The positions of the UK, Germany and the Netherlands are 
larger, while those of most other EU countries are smaller.  
·  Trade to GDP relation: Swiss exports of 'other commercial services' to the European Union 
represent some 6 per cent of Swiss GDP. This is a bit higher than for the EU average, which is 
due to the fact that the EU is dominated by some large countries where trade openness is 
generally a bit lower than in small countries. It is therefore more appropriate to compare 
Switzerland with a country like Belgium; other commercial services trade and GDP of Belgium 
 
16 FDI stocks in non-service sectors are also affected by the heterogeneity and a country's relative intensity of product-
market regulation.  
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are almost identical with the Swiss figures. Hence, with respect to the relation between GDP 
and services trade, Switzerland is completely in line with comparable EU countries. 
·  Relative size of Switzerland in independent variables: both for total services and for 'other 
commercial services' it holds that the size of Swiss services trade is approximately 4 per cent of 
trade by EU15 countries. Swiss FDI stocks (all sectors) in the EU represent about 8 per cent of 
total intra-EU FDI stocks. 
 
We have tested whether the Swiss data are outliers in the EU sample using Grubb’s test for 
outliers.
17 This test was done for each additional Switzerland-related observation. Grubb's test is 
applied for the following regression variables: bilateral other commercial services trade, 
bilateral FDI stocks, GDP, distance, language distance, level of product market regulation, level 
of FDI restriction, barriers for entrepreneurship, and the heterogeneity variables on 
administrative barriers to start-ups, Barriers to competition, Regulatory and administrative 
opacity, State control,  and Explicit barriers to trade and investment. The hypothesis that an 
observation is no outlier was never rejected for the Switzerland-related observations. The 
results of these tests also indicate that the Swiss data points fit well in the EU sample. 
 
Given the data analysis so far it is highly unlikely that the inclusion of Swiss data points would 
substantially alter the EU parameter estimates and the results of the scenario analysis. The 
estimation results will not change significantly if the data for Switzerland are included in the 
sample. This allows us to use our earlier elasticity estimates (cf. Annex 1) to analyse the impact 
of the EU Services directive on bilateral trade between Switzerland and the EU. Moreover, it 
should be noted that the scenario outcomes are expressed as an order of magnitude, and must 
also be interpreted as such rather than as single-point forecasts. Effects of small changes in 
parameters due to the inclusion of the Swiss data points most likely fall within the presented 
uncertainty range.  
 
4.2  Results of the scenario analysis for Switzerland-EU services trade 
The scenario analysis uses the estimated elasticities of bilateral services trade with respect to the 
policy variables in origin and destination country, especially those that reflect the response of 
bilateral trade to a higher or lower level of policy heterogeneity.
18 Using these elasticities and 
 
17 This test takes the absolute value of an observation minus the mean. This absolute value divided by the standard 
deviation. The mean and standard deviation are calculated using the EU sample excluding the Swiss data. The test results 
are available upon request. 
18 The estimated coefficients (and their standard errors) are reported in the second data column of Annex I. Note that 
exports are estimated in logs. So the new export level equals the old export level (2001) times the exponent of the product of 
the change in heterogeneity and the estimated coefficient.  
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the expected impact of the Services Directive on policy heterogeneity (reported in Table 3.5), 
we calculate the expected change in bilateral services exports. The change percentage is 
different for every bilateral relation between Switzerland and individual EU countries, because 
the heterogeneity in regulation and the change induced by the EU directive varies for each 
country pair. 
 
Our estimates are presented as a range of likely outcomes. The reason for presenting a range 
rather than a single figure is that the estimates are subject to two types of uncertainty, one 
statistical and one on the eventual impact of the directive on bilateral policy heterogeneity. With 
respect to the latter we use the bandwidth on the expected impact of the EU directive on the 
heterogeneity indicators as presented in table 3.5. The statistical uncertainty reflects the 
confidence interval of our elasticity estimates: we use an interval of the estimated parameter 
plus and minus one standard error. We combine the two kinds of uncertainties for presenting the 
effects for Switzerland in three variants: a minimum-effect variant, a central variant and a 
maximum-effect variant.  
 
Table 4.1  Impact on Swiss-EU bilateral trade in commercial services
b)
 (% change based on 2001 data) 
Effects    Minimum variant
a)
        Central variant
 a)
       Maximum variant
 a)
 
             












             
Total effect on Swiss- - - - EU trade in 'other 
commercial services'  
    40     41      60     60      84      85 
of which:             
* due to less heterogeneity in Barriers to competition      30      30      44      45      63      63 
* due to less heterogeneity in Explicit barriers to 
trade and investment   10   10  16  16  22  22 
        a)
 The central effect is calculated by using the parameter estimates and the middle of the bandwidth on the expected impact of the directive 
on regulatory heterogeneity. The minimum-effect variant uses the values of the parameter estimates minus one standard error and taking the 
minimum value of the bandwidth in table 3.5. The maximum-effect variant uses the values of the parameter estimates plus one standard 
error, and takes the maximum value of the bandwidth in table 3.5.
  
b)
 Data for 'Other Commercial Services' . This aggregate includes trade, distribution, business services, hotels and restaurants, personal 
services, construction and financial services.  See main text for a note on the impact of financial services.  
 
Table 4.1 presents the results for Switzerland, and decomposes it with respect to the underlying 
policy factors. The effects on Swiss commercial services exports to the EU vary,  according to 
the scenario involved, between +40 and +85 per cent, whereas the effects on imports vary 
between +41 and +85 per cent. This is a fairly broad range. About three-quarters of the effect 
stems from reduced heterogeneity in the policy sub-domain Barriers to competition, the rest 
from reduced heterogeneity in Explicit barriers to trade and investment. The reduced 
heterogeneity in the latter category is more important for Switzerland than for the EU15. This  
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explains to a large extent the bigger trade effects of the proposed directive for Switzerland than 
these are for the EU15. 
 
4.3  Impacts on bilateral Switzerland-EU direct investment stocks 
Our econometric results indicate that the size of bilateral FDI stocks is significantly affected by 
the heterogeneity and intensity in regulation. Using these quantitative results we now 
investigate the effects on Swiss-EU bilateral FDI stocks when Switzerland would also apply the 
2004 EU proposal for a services directive. 
 
As a starting point we take the preferred parameter estimates (reported in the last data column 
of Annex 1). Note that the bilateral FDI stocks are also affected by a lower level of national FDI 
restrictions in the destination countries.
19 To account for the effects of the proposed directive on 
bilateral regulation heterogeneity we again use the expected impact of the EU directive on the 
regulation heterogeneity (Table 3.5). For every country pair we estimated the expected change 
in FDI stocks that results from the implementation of the EU directive; it differs for each 
bilateral relation, because the heterogeneity in regulation varies for per country pair. Because 
the estimated coefficients apply to total FDI stocks, we correct the total result for the share in 
FDI stock of those services that are covered by the proposed EU directive. Here we apply a 
correction factor based on EU data. Chapter 5 shows the impact of alternative assumptions. 
The resulting changes in FDI stocks are presented as a bandwidth between a maximum and a 
minimum effect, in the same way as was done for bilateral exports. The central variant is 
calculated by using the parameter estimates and the middle of the bandwidth on the expected 
impact of the directive on regulatory heterogeneity. Table 4.2 presents the effects on bilateral 
FDI stocks between Switzerland and the EU, together with a decomposition showing the 
impacts of the underlying policy factors. 
 
Swiss FDI stocks in the EU services sector could increase by 20 to 41 per cent as a consequence 
of applying the services directive, while EU foreign direct investment stocks in the Swiss 
services sector could increase by 29 to 55 per cent. The largest effects are caused by the fact 
that the directive will reduce the heterogeneity in Barriers to competition, and the level of FDI 
restrictions. A much smaller positive effect results because the services directive may also  
 
19 For the level effect we assume a 30% reduction for investors from  EU member states. This is a conservative estimate, 
because the directive does not aim at abandoning national regulation or lowering national regulation levels. However, some 
elements of the directive (single point of contact, electronic handling of administrative requirement for firm start-ups, a ban 
on discriminative requirements for foreign firms) will effectively lower the level of regulation as experienced by investors from 
Switzerland and the EU member states.   
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 Table 4.2  Impact on Swiss-EU bilateral FDI stocks in services (% change based on 1999 data) 
   Minimum variant
a)
      Central variant
 a)
      Maximum variant
 a)
 
             












             
Total effect on Swiss- - - - EU direct investment   20  29  29  41  41  55 
of which:             
* due to less heterogeneity in Barriers to competition  9  9  15  15  23  23 
* due to less heterogeneity in State control  0  0  1  1  2  2 
* due to lower level of FDI restrictions 
c)
   10  20  13  25  16  31 
              a)
 The central effect is calculated by using the parameter estimates and the middle of the bandwidth on the expected impact of the directive 
on regulatory heterogeneity. The minimum-effect variant uses the values of the parameter estimates minus one standard error and taking the 
minimum value of the bandwidth in table 3.5. The maximum-effect variant uses the values of the parameter estimates plus one standard 
error, and takes the maximum value of the bandwidth in table 3.5.
  
b)
 This refers to possible negative effects from reduced heterogeneity in other policy areas (Regulatory and administrative opacity; 
administrative barriers to start-ups) and a reduced level of regulation with respect to Barriers to entrepreneurship. These effects are based on 
the non-significant elasticities for the policy variables reported in Annex I (last data column: destination countries). We apply the estimated 
parameters, uncorrected for the standard error. The negative impact of reduced heterogeneity in Administrative barriers to start-ups 
dominates. 
c)
 Each country's FDI restrictions for the base year are derived from the OECD (Golub et al. 2003). 
 
reduce some heterogeneity in State control. The effects on inward stocks are larger than for the 
outward FDI stocks, because Switzerland has more restrictive inward-FDI barriers compared 
with the EU. The reduction in these (higher) barriers causes larger effects. 
. 
4.4  Impacts of the Services Directive on Swiss-EU trade and investment: 
conclusions 
Our results indicate that the introduction of the 2004 EU services directive in Switzerland 
would very much intensify the economic relations between the service industries of Switzerland 
and the European Union. We have only investigated the direct effects of mutual liberalisation of 
services markets. These are strictly positive, both for Switzerland and the EU. Swiss exports of 
commercial services to the EU could increase by 40 to 84 per cent, while Swiss foreign direct 
investment stocks in EU services industries could increase by 20 to 41 per cent. EU services 
exports to Switzerland may rise by 41 to 85 per cent, while EU direct investment stocks in 
Swiss service markets could rise by 29 to 55 per cent.   
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5  Discussion of the main results 
This chapter discusses the quantitative results in the light of the underlying assumptions and 
data limitations.  
Structure of bilateral effects: decomposition of bilateral trade effects  
In Table 5.1 the expected increase in Swiss trade in ('other') commercial services is decomposed 
by EU partner country. Even more than for the aggregate trade effects, the decomposed results 
should be interpreted as an order of magnitude rather than as point estimates. Keeping this in 
mind, Switzerland's largest bilateral trade increase will arise -in absolute terms- with partner 
countries United Kingdom, and Germany. The trade increase with other large trade partners 
(France, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium) will be much smaller. In relative terms, trade 
increases most substantially with France and Italy. 
Table 5.1     Decomposition of expected increase in bilateral trade of Switzerland with EU14 members due  
                    to the Services Directive,  Central variant, reference year 2001  
     
Partner country 
Increase % of  
Swiss services exports 
to partner country 
a)
  
Increase % of  
Swiss services 




Value of actual  
Swiss imports  
in 2001  
(mln. USD) 
       
Denmark  ..   ..   .. 
Greece  64  64  84 
Sweden  65  65  427 
United Kingdom  64  64  2493 
Austria  58  58  454 
Belgium-Luxembourg  42  42  1058 
Finland  55  55  25 
France  70  70  1236 
Germany  57  57  2267 
Ireland  ..   ..   .. 
Italy  80  80  1255 
Netherlands  62  62  796 
Portugal  48  48  52 
Spain  ..   ..   .. 
       
Total trade Switzerland  60  60  3384 
      a)  Trade in other commercial services. Note that for the central scenario it holds that the percentage point increase of 
Swiss service exports is about the same as the increase in imports with a particular partner country. 
 
 
The differences in the bilateral trade effects per EU country are explained by the fact that the 
policy heterogeneity differs for each specific country pair. Two policy sub-domains are most 
decisive for bilateral services trade: Barriers to competition and Administrative barriers to  
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start-ups. Three-quarters of the effect is caused because the EU services directive effectively 
lowres heterogeneity with regard to Barriers to competition. Figure 5.1 plots the country 
structure of Swiss services exports against bilateral policy heterogeneity in the policy sub-
domain Barriers to competition.  
 
Figure 5.1  Structure of Swiss exports of commercial services to EU countries and bilateral policy 
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Note: Refers to trade in 'other commercial services' in 2001. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
The largest effects occur in trade with those partner countries that (before introduction of the 
EU directive) have product-market regulations that are very different from Switzerland. 
Figure 5.1 shows that this is the case with its important trading partners like Germany, Italy, 
and the UK. Adoption of the EU services directive by Switzerland is expected to have the 
largest impact in the bilateral trade with these partner countries.  
 
A similar country decomposition can be made for bilateral FDI relations with EU member 
states. Table 5.2 indicates that there is a clear difference between absolute and relative gains in 
bilateral FDI traffic per country.  
 
In relative terms, Swiss FDI stock is expected to grow most in Austria, Finland and the 
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal), whereas the increase in Ireland, the  
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Netherlands, and Belgium-Luxembourg will be small. The Italian, Danish, Spanish and British 
FDI position in Switzerland are expected to register the largest relative growth. In absolute 
terms, however, the value of Swiss FDI in UK, Germany, and France will grow most. 
Conversely, the absolute value growth of German, French and Dutch FDI stocks will account 
for most of the increased EU FDI position in the Swiss services sector.  
 
Table 5.2     Decomposition of expected change in Swiss - EU service FDI relations due to Services  
                    Directive, Central variant, reference year 1999 
     
Partner country 
Absolute increase in 
Swiss outward FDI 
stock (mln USD) 
a)
 
Increase % of  
Swiss outward FDI 
stock in services 
b)
 
Absolute increase in 
Swiss inward FDI  
stock (mln USD) 
a)
 
Increase % of  
Swiss inward FDI  
stock in services 
b)
 
         
Austria  1849  63  147  40 
Spain  1655  45  148  45 
Finland  504  42  ..  .. 
Italy  2379  37  1802  49 
Sweden  476  36  116  41 
Portugal  400  34  ..  .. 
Greece  522  34  ..  .. 
Denmark  262  33  258  47 
Germany  5120  29  4998  43 
France  3182  29  3986  39 
United Kingdom  6404  27  2221  44 
Belgium-Luxembourg  2167  25  1453  39 
Netherlands  2808  22  5157  37 
Ireland  1255  18  ..  .. 
       
Total for Switzerland  28982  29  20286  41 




The differences in bilateral FDI stocks are mostly due to the effect of the services directive on 
bilateral policy heterogeneity with respect to 'Barriers to competition' (already shown in 
Figure 5.1), and to the diminished level of regulatory restrictions for investing foreign services 
firms. Figure 5.2 displays the initial level of FDI restrictions per country against the country 
share in Switzerland's outward FDI stocks. The picture clarifies why FDI in Austria is likely to 
grow. 
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Note: A country's relative intensity of FDI restrictions is measured by the OECD index described in Golub (2003).  
 
 
Impact on total FDI stock and on services FDI stock 
Due to lacking data on bilateral FDI in specific services sectors we use data for total FDI stock 
(all sectors). Hence, we must account for the fact that the services directive will affect only part 
of the total bilateral FDI stocks. In the period 1998-2000, one-third of average FDI inflows in 
the EU went to sectors that are covered by the proposed EU directive (Kox, Lejour and 
Montizaan 2004a). Note that the current share is partly the endogenous result of the present-day 
policy heterogeneity and sectoral FDI restrictions in the EU countries. We therefore kept on the 
conservative side when we used a 0.33 correction factor for the expected FDI stock increase for 
services. 
This 0.33 correction factor has also been used for Switzerland in Table 4.2. However, in 
chapter 2 is was shown that the sectoral structure of Swiss inward and outward FDI stocks is 
quite different (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). This suggest that for Switzerland we should apply a 
differentiated correction factor for inward and outward FDI stocks. Otherwise we might over-
estimate the effect of the services directive on Swiss outward FDI stocks, while at the same we 
under-estimate its impacts on Swiss inward FDI stocks.  
By way of sensitivity analysis, Table 5.3 shows the results of different weighting assumptions. 
For Swiss outward FDI stocks we use a 0.10 correction factor and for foreign FDI stocks in  
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Switzerland we use a 0.70 correction factor. This correction would imply a larger difference 
between expected changes in incoming and outgoing FDI stocks due to the services directive.  
 
Table 5.3  Impact on Swiss-EU bilateral FDI stocks in services: alternative weighting assumptions 
a)
  for the 
services share in total FDI stock (% change based on 1999 data) 
   Minimum variant
a)
      Central variant
 a)
      Maximum variant
 a)
 
             












             
Total effect on Swiss- EU direct investment   6  64  9  90  12  122 
 
a) For the results in this table it is assumed that the services directive affects 0.10 of Swiss FDI outstock and 0.70 of the total foreign FDI 
stocks in Switzerland. (In Table 4.2 an identical weighting factor of 0.33 was assumed for both cases).  
 
A note on the role of financial services in Swiss services trade  
As shown in chapter 2, Switzerland has a relatively high component (27%) of financial services 
in its services trade: 27 per cent of its total services trade to all countries, and 50 per cent of 
'other commercial services' exports to all countries. The data in chapter 2 suggest that the share 
of financial services in trade with EU countries might be somewhat lower. Nevertheless, some 
caution is required as to translating the predicted rise in EU-Swiss services trade into growth 
figures at a lower aggregation level than 'other commercial services' (for which the parameter 
estimates were done). Financial services as such will be hardly affected by the EU services 
directive.
20 Further sectoral specification would require additional research and more sector-
specific bilateral trade details. 
Missing country observations 
The trade effects of the services directive in Table 4.1 are calculated on the basis of an 
incomplete set of data on bilateral services trade between Switzerland and the EU. Data are 
lacking on commercial services trade between Switzerland and Spain, Denmark and Ireland. 
Although these countries probably are no large trading partners, we have reason to expect that 
completion of the data set with these countries would increase rather than diminish the relative 
trade growth due to the services directive. This is due to the structure of bilateral policy 
heterogeneity of Switzerland with these countries.
21 Annex 2 shows the value of the relevant 
policy variables.  
 
20 There could be some effects in the area of auxiliary financial services. 
21 The structure of Swiss policy heterogeneity in the policy sub-domain Barriers to competition with the missing countries is 
larger than with the EU average, while the opposite holds for policy heterogeneity in the sub-domain Administrative barriers 
to start-ups (a countervailing force, cf. Table 4.1).  
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Indirect welfare effects of a common adoption of the EU services directive 
The assessment in this report did not quantify other economic effects outside the trade and FDI 
effects. More openness and less policy heterogeneity in the European market for services may 
however cause several - often positive- indirect welfare effects. We mention the most 
important indirect welfare effects. 
The overall economic growth potential of both Switzerland and the EU countries may 
improve due to a rise in the productivity of the service industries. There are three main channels 
along which the productivity jump may take shape: (a) the service sector will be better capable 
of exploiting scale economies through production for other European markets; (b) the 
competitive selection process will become stronger, causing under-performing firms to exit 
sooner; and (c) the influx of more productive foreign subsidiaries raises overall productivity of 
domestic service industries.
22 With regard to the last-mentioned productivity effect, several 
authors provide evidence for the existence of positive spillovers in the USA and the UK (Haskel 
et al. 2002; Keller and Yeaple 2003). It is plausible that in services, and in particular 
intermediate services, positive spillovers will occur through forward linkages.
23  
Another welfare effect runs through changes in the domestic producer surplus. In some 
cases, the profits of domestic service producers will be affected positively due to more export 
possibilities. Less competitive domestic producers will see their profits affected in a negative 
way. The balance between these two groups of producers may differ by economic sector. It 
would require much more detailed research to quantify this effect.  
More competition lowers service prices, brings more variety and innovative service 
products. This will enlarge the consumer surplus, and thus benefit domestic consumers in 
Switzerland and EU countries. Also producers can benefit. Since the most internationally traded 
services are intermediate inputs, more European competition will lower intermediate unit input 




22 Cf. Görg and Strobl (2001). 
23 Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) argues that such spillovers mainly arise through vertically oriented FDI (backward linkages, 
joint ventures) and not so much through horizontal direct investments and forward linkages. This analysis is only based on 
evidence for manufacturing, however.   
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6  Conclusions 
The present report quantifies the possible effects on the bilateral services trade and FDI between 
Switzerland and EU member states for a scenario in which Switzerland voluntarily adopts the 
EU services directive. We assume that this adoption goes along with a formal agreement 
between Switzerland and the EU on mutual recognition of services regulations. This would 
mean full integration of Switzerland in the European internal services market. 
 
The European Commission's 2004 proposals for a Services Directive consists of measures to 
reduce or eliminate the obstacles of cross-border trade of services by introducing the ‘country of 
origin’ principle. It implies that regulation of the country of origin is relevant, and that the 
country of destination has no right to impose new regulation. The European Commission has 
also proposed measures to reduce the obstacles for the establishment of an affiliate abroad by 
introducing a single point of contact for the service providers to deal with all rules and 
procedures. Moreover, the EC also introduces mechanisms to build up trust of the member 
states in each other national regulatory regimes. The EU proposal is only partially aimed at 
reducing the level of service market regulation in Member States, although local producers 
might benefit as well from some proposed measures that focus on the elimination of 
unnecessary and EU-incompatible national regulations. 
 
Our results indicate that the introduction of the 2004 EU services directive in Switzerland 
would very much intensify the economic relations between the service industries of Switzerland 
and the European Union. We have investigated the direct effects of mutual liberalisation of 
services markets. These are strictly positive, both for Switzerland and the EU.  
 
Our estimates are presented as a range of likely outcomes, given statistical uncertainties and 
uncertainties related to the eventual implementation form of the services directive. The results 
must therefore be interpreted as a likely order of magnitude of the long-term effects rather than 
as point forecasts. Keeping this in mind, Swiss exports of commercial services to the EU could 
increase by 40 to 84 per cent, while Swiss foreign direct investment stocks in EU services 
industries could increase by 20 to 41 per cent. EU services exports to Switzerland may rise by 
41 to 85 per cent, while EU direct investment stocks in Swiss service markets could rise by 29 
to 55 per cent. The expected impacts on bilateral Swiss-EU FDI stocks would change if we 
account for the different composition of the Swiss inward and outward FDI stocks. Correcting 
for this, the Swiss outward FDI stocks would increase by only 6 to 12 per cent, while the inward 
FDI stock might increase by 64 to 122 per cent. 
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Our analysis does not take into account more indirect welfare effects of  the EU services 
directive such as those related with more competition, lower services prices, positive effects for 
labour productivity growth in services, and the supply of innovative services from abroad.  
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Annex I     Estimation Results 
Explaining bilateral trade in commercial services and bilateral direct investment 
Transformed variables, DM method 
b)
 
               FIML
a  estimation method                  SUR
a   estimation method 
         
Dependent variable:  Bilateral service exports  Bilateral direct investment 
         
















Gravity variables         
ln GDP Origin  0.83*** 
(0.04) 
  0.95*** 
(0.09) 
 
ln GDP Destination    0.88*** 
(0.04) 
  0.74*** 
(0.06) 












-0.15    
(0.14) 
-0.15    
(0.14) 
ln( productivity service sector origin 
country) 
    0.05*** 
(0.01) 
 
         
Policy level variables         




  -0.87*** 
(0.18) 
 
Barriers to entrepreneurship, 
destination country 
  -0.03   
(0.07)  
  - 0.21    
(0.13) 
FDI regulation indicator, destination 
country 
      -8.27*** 
(1.42) 
         
Policy heterogeneity variables         
























-0.89    
(0.56) 
-0.89    
(0.56) 




















         




   




   
         
Constant  dummies for 
destination 
significant  
dummies for  
origin significant 
dummies for 
destination significant  
dummies for  
origin significant 
         
Number of observations  481  481  195  260 
         
Adjusted R-squared  0.70  0.61  0.66  0.47 
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Notes on Annex I:  
 
a) Estimation method: Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) for trade and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for FDI stocks. In both 
cases, applying simultaneous estimation of equations for origin and destination countries. All bilateral variables expressed as deviation from the mean. 
This is done separately from the origin (exporting) country perspective, and from the destination (host) country perspective. Erkel-Rousse and Mirza 
(2002) impose identical coefficients for distance and language in the equations for origin and destination country. We do the same and also impose 
identical coefficients for policy heterogeneity for origin and destination country. Absolute value of standard error in brackets. Codes: *** = significant at 
1% level;  ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level.    
 
b) DM method (described in Kox and Lejour 2005).  
 
c) In case of origin country perspective, we use data expressed as deviations from the mean host (destination) country, thus allowing for estimation of 
exporter-specific variables.  
 
d) With the destination country perspective, we use data expressed as deviations from the mean exporter (origin) country, thus allowing for estimation 
of destination-specific variables. 
 





Table A2    Structure of Swiss policy heterogeneity with the EU countries for which no bilateral service trade 
                   data are available 








         
Bilateral policy heterogeneity with 
respect to Barriers to competition 
0.35  0.42  0.21  0.43 
Bilateral policy heterogeneity with 
respect to Explicit barriers to trade 
and investment 
0.22  0.30  0.33  0.40 
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